The Politics of Pillage: The political economy of roadblocks in the Central African Republic

This report explores the political economy of trade routes in the Central African Republic (CAR). Its main finding is that control over transit is a much coveted stake in the CAR’s ongoing con ict, with road space constituting a significant source of illicit wealth accumulation among different state and non-state actors. This translates into the omnipresence of roadblocks.

This report identifies a total of 284 roadblocks. Of these, 117 (or 41%) are operated by government forces, 149 (or 52 percent) by ex-Seleka groups, and 40 (or 14%) by anti-balaka groups. In some cases, two different armed actors share control over a single roadblock. In general, however, roadblocks operated by governmental structures (ranging from different administrative entities, to the police and the military) are largely concentrated in the south-western part of the country. Roadblocks operated by different armed groups concentrate around trade routes crossing the rest of the country.
Ex-Seleka groups control more roadblocks than government forces overall, but the gendarmerie is the largest individual operator of roadblocks, with a presence at 92 or 32% of all mapped roadblocks in the CAR. The gendarmerie is followed by the FPRC, present at 61 or 21% of roadblocks. Third place is shared by the UPC, the MPC and anti-balaka groups, each controlling around 40 or 14% of barriers.

This report identifies three main economic circuits on which roadblocks concentrate: the cattle circuit has 62 barriers (22% of the total) where ex-Seleka groups impose taxes; the Sudanese circuit is also dominated by former Seleka factions and has 64 barriers (23%); and finally, the ‘legal’ circuit has 26 barriers (9%) controlled by state services. The remainder of the CAR’s roadblocks are scattered across its wider road network.

The involvement of ex-Seleka groups in these economic circuits, however, goes beyond taxation at roadblocks. Customs or ‘free passage’ taxes are levied on traders passing through areas under their control, and in some cases obligatory, paid, escorts are imposed. Case studies outlined in this report detail these mechanisms of extortion. We estimate that ex-Seleka armed groups generate around EUR 6 million per year by imposing taxes on the main economic circuits in the area under their control. Of this, EUR 3.59 million per year derives from their interference with the cattle circuit, and 2.38 EUR million from the Sudanese circuit.