The border business: a political economy analysis of checkpoint taxation in Afghanistan

This study investigates the political economy of cross-border trade routes and informal taxation in post-Bonn Afghanistan (2001–2021), extending into the Taliban era (2021–2024). It particularly focuses on checkpoint taxation as a means of creating and negotiating rents between state and non-state actors. By examining how informal taxation by non-state actors has significantly impacted the state’s revenue generation and broader state-building efforts over the past two decades, the study delves into the interplay between checkpoint taxation, power dynamics and state-building in a conflict-affected setting. It places these interactions within a broader historical context spanning over two centuries. The research systematically maps out key influential non-state actors, including the Taliban, who controlled both legal and illegal trade routes. The study underscores the significance of checkpoint taxation not only in financing the Taliban’s insurgency, which contributed to the collapse of the Republic, but also in transforming a rebel group into a de facto authority.