Implications of Tanzania’s central-local governmental power relationship for climate change adaptation financing at the local level

The aim of this paper is to analyse how resource struggles between central and local governments shape local adaptation efforts. While national climate frameworks reflect country-specific political economies and power structures, the influence of central – local relations on adaptation financing at the local level remain underexplored. Using the case of Tanzania, the paper investigates how existing central-local power relations impact local climate change adaptation financing. We combine Structuration Theory and Multilevel Governance to expore how institutional structures and actor agency shape local climate adaptation financing. The data are qualitative and derived from interviews, document analysis, and field observations. Our findings suggest a complex relationship, where power and resources are centralized, thus leaving local actors toothless. Toothless in this paper refers to local governments holding formal adaptation mandates without the financial or decision-making authority to implement them. Additionally, the findings show local politicians (councillors) wield more power than local government officials, and the political dynamics they engage in threaten the local climate change financing. These dynamics undermine the effectiveness and equity of adaptation finance by steering resources towards politically visible projects rather than locally informed, long-term resilience needs, highlighting the importance of strengthening local governments’ authority and technical capacity.