'Don't mention the war': The failure of historical analogies in geopolitical decision-making

As seldom before, the current war in Ukraine has seen the use of World War II analogies by belligerents and also some Western non-belligerents. They thereby follow in the footsteps of such political leaders as Anthony Eden, Margaret Thatcher, Joseph Stalin, or John F. Kennedy. Indeed, statesmen sometimes make decisions by referring to a lesson from an ‘analogous’ historical situation, overriding or colouring the interpretation of contemporary concerns. Regarding geopolitical decisions, reference is typically made to the last major war of one’s own country. That is, however, seldom a good idea, since critical conditions have usually changed in the meantime. This is illustrated here by four case studies, two based on a World War II, and two based on a World War I lesson. It is argued that any historical analogy formulated by a political leader should make alarm bells ring regarding the contemporary decision or project being legitimised. However, if such analogical decision-making cannot be avoided (which would be preferable), it is imperative to let at least two alternative analogies ‘compete’ in the decision-making process so as to avoid groupthink. In relation to the contemporary Ukraine war, these results do not bode well for either Russia or the West. Misled by their analogies, Russia initially overstated NATOs ambitions in Ukraine, and NATO now overstates Russia’s ambitions beyond Ukraine. It is almost impossible to back down from these exaggerations.