Checkpoints, transport networks, and armed conflicts: towards a relational approach

This working paper introduces a relational approach to checkpoint violence in conflict regions. We first examine whether violence observed near checkpoints is structurally conditioned by their position within a transport system rather than simply being explained by their proximity to roads. We then examine whether violent actors manning checkpoints are primarily motivated by providing security or by extracting resources. The study of two West African regions suggests that the checkpoints experiencing the most violence are those guarding access to intersections connecting multiple locations, or intersections linking several regions that would otherwise remain disconnected. The paper also suggests that a majority of violent events and fatalities result from the competition for the control of checkpoints between government forces and a myriad of violent non-state actors. The predatory side of checkpoints is exercised at the expense of civilians, who not only have to pay bribes, but are also regularly beaten, kidnapped and killed. Although a general theory of checkpoint violence is still premature, our preliminary analysis contributes to enrich the debate about how political power is effectively exercised over geographical space. Checkpoints are an emblematic location from which a more ‘networked’ form of political and economic sovereignty is projected.