Border control paradox: The political economy of smuggling between Colombia and Venezuela

This paper explores state-criminal co-operation in roadblock politics. It discusses the way in which between 2015 and 2023 the bilateral tensions and border closure between Colombia and Venezuela created a political economy of smuggling in which state officials delegated basic state functions to organised crime groups to contain foes, domesticate illegal economies and maintain social control. The fundamentals of this political economy are negotiated mobility instances taking place at checkpoints deployed in the multiple informal trails along the borderland where smugglers, organised crime groups and state officials interact. This paper expands a long-term research agenda on borders and criminal governance in Colombia through direct observations, in-depth interviews, and secondary data. Besides contributing to the crime-conflict nexus literature, it improves our knowledge of the rationales behind the arrangements between organised crime groups and states at borderlands, expanding the research agenda on criminal governance.